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In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the 
philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the 
second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced 
twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the 
themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind. 
 
In a 1964 lecture on Shakespeare, Jorge Luis Borges offers us ‘one possible 
definition of the work of genius: a book of genius is a book that can be 
read in a slightly or very different way by each generation’ (Borges 1999: 
473). Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason fits this bill. Since its 
publication, it has been read in a wide variety of often conflicting ways. 
The same is true of his theoretical writings more generally. Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy can be read as a contribution to epistemology, to 
metaphysics, to the philosophy of science – and no doubt to many more 
philosophical projects, both esoteric and mundane. 
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The title of this volume might suggest that we mean to add to these 
readings: Immanuel Kant was, primarily, a philosopher of mind. This is to 
overstate our intent. For one thing, these disciplinary boundaries are 
somewhat artificial and many philosophical projects fall under more than 
one category. Should an exploration into the possibility of a certain sort of 
judgment count as an exercise in epistemology or the philosophy of mind? 
Indeed – as some Oxford philosophers have been heard to say – if 
knowing is a mental state, isn’t all epistemology a branch of the 
philosophy of mind? Given the permeability of philosophical boundaries, 
much work in theoretical philosophy may be as much a contribution to 
the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and so on, as to 
epistemology and metaphysics. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the Critique of Pure Reason is often most 
straightforwardly classed as a work of epistemology and metaphysics. Kant 
tells us, in the Introduction to that work, that his project can be 
summarised in the question: how are synthetic judgments a priori possible? 
(B19). This raises issues in epistemology about our claim to know a certain 
class of statements. In answering his question, Kant provides both an 
account of the sources and limits of our knowledge and an account of how 
reality must be structured in order to vouchsafe this knowledge. This is a 
contribution to metaphysics. Since one of Kant’s reasons for asking this 
question is to articulate the conditions under which scientific knowledge is 
possible, the work forms the basis for a philosophy of science. And, 
ultimately, through securing the compatibility of the scientific world-view 
with human freedom, it provides the basis for an explanation of the 
possibility of ethics itself. 
But Kant’s answer to his question about the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgements turns on the role that our mental faculties play in cognition. 
And this means that lying behind the account of knowledge and reality is a 
complex and influential account of our mental faculties, their role in 
representation, their logical and transcendental structure and their 
expression in thought and action. The essays in this volume concern these 
aspects of Kant’s Critical views. They treat him, as our title has it, as 
engaged in the philosophy of mind. 
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This chapter serves as an anchor to the essays that follow. In Part 1 I 
summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are 
addressed in Kant’s critical writings in a way which is intended to be 
accessible for those without a background in the material. In Part 2 I chart 
some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century 
philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition. I have attempted, so far as is 
possible, to stay reasonably neutral on issues of controversy but, given the 
nature of philosophical debate, some of the claims which follow will be 
open to dispute. Nevertheless, I hope these won’t prevent the chapter from 
serving as a background to the issues which arise elsewhere in this 
collection. 
I. Kant and the Mind 
There are many aspects to Kant’s discussion of the mind in his theoretical 
philosophy. The two most prominent are his account of the cognitive 
subject and his attack on the rational psychologist’s conception of the self. 
The first of these is central to the story Kant tells about the source and 
limits of our knowledge. It is because our minds are structured a certain 
way that an explanation can be provided of the possibility of synthetic a 
priori judgements. This provides us with an account of the thinking, 
perceiving agent. The second takes place in the Paralogisms of Pure 
Reason and consists of a battery of criticisms against the rational 
psychologist conception of the self as a simple, substantial unity persisting 
through time. Together, they constitute a sophisticated and distinctive 
account of the self which stands opposed to the empiricist and rationalist 
accounts of the mind which preceded it. 
But Kant’s discussions in the philosophy of mind extend far beyond this 
account of the self, as sophisticated and original as it is. Other topics 
discussed include the spatial and temporal nature of perceptual 
representation, the structural differences between perceptual and 
conceptual representations, the involvement of the will in judgement and 
belief, the relation of cognition to feeling and desire, and many others. 
Each of these addresses an issue about our mentality, its place in our 
cognitive life, and its place in the world. Furthermore, Kant’s ethical 
philosophy is founded on an account of human action and its relation to 
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the causal structure of the empirical world. Contemporary philosophy of 
mind places the philosophy of action squarely within its remit and this 
account of how humans act is an account of how our mental faculties are 
expressed in the empirical world. The practical philosophy also, then, 
connects to issues concerning our mentality. 
The Cognitive Subject 
The centrepiece of Kant’s account of the human mind is his division of 
the cognitive mind into two distinct faculties: a passive faculty of 
sensibility and an active faculty of the understanding (A50/B74). 
Sensibility, the receptive faculty, is a capacity to receive representations 
through being affected in some way (A51/B75); the understanding is a 
spontaneous faculty which brings forth its own representations 
(A51/B75).1 This division seemed to Kant to be a genuine innovation. It 
first appears in his 1770 Inaugural Dissertation, and when he says, in a 
handwritten note, that ‘the year [17]69 gave me a great light’ (R 18:69), he 
is likely referring to his recognition of the distinction between the 
sensibility and the understanding which preceded that work. In the first 
Critique he explicitly accuses his predecessors – he mentions Locke and 
Leibniz by name – of misconstruing the distinction between sensibility 
and the understanding (A271/B327). For they mistook a difference in 
kind for a difference in degree. 
Two aspects of this division are important. First, that each faculty cannot 
be reduced to the other. This is evidenced in the fact that each faculty has 
its own representations by means of which it relates to objects: ‘Objects are 
therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us 
intuitions; but they are thought through the understanding, and from it 
 
1 I focus here on the cognitive aspect of the human mind. See below for discussion of the 
faculties of feeling and desire. I use the term ‘the understanding’ in its broad sense, to 
pick out the higher faculty of cognition in general (as Kant does at, e.g. ML1 28:240). 
Kant further distinguishes the understanding into different aspects: reason, the 
understanding ‘in the strict sense’ (ML1 28:241) and judgement. Reason deals with a 
priori concepts whose objects need not be met with in experience, whilst the 
understanding in the strict sense deals only with what is or can be given in sensibility. 
The faculty of judgement, the capacity to subsume under rules (A132/B171), is treated 
briefly in the Critique of Pure Reason but takes centre-stage in the Critique of the Power of 
Judgement. 
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arise concepts’ (A19/B33). Intuitions are immediate and particular 
representations through which objects are given to us (A19/B33, A68/B93; 
JL 9:91). Concepts are mediate, general representations which relate us to 
objects by means of marks which can be common to more than one thing 
(A25/B40, A320/B376, JL 9:58). 
Second, that the two faculties are individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient in finite beings for what Kant calls ‘Erkenntnis’. ‘Erkenntnis’ 
here is a technical term and though early twentieth-century English 
translations rendered the term as ‘knowledge’, there has been an increasing 
recognition in the last few decades that Erkenntnis cannot be identified 
with knowledge, at least if knowledge is understood as the kind of 
propositional knowledge which has been the subject of contemporary 
epistemology (Chignell 2014, Gomes and Stephenson 2016, Schafer 
forthcoming, Watkins and Willaschek forthcoming). Recent translations 
prefer the term ‘cognition’, whose use I will follow. In very rough and 
broad terms, we can think of cognition as involving the mind’s being 
determinately related to an object – ‘the determinate relation of given 
representations to an object’ (B137) as Kant puts it – where standing in 
such a relation to an object is a necessary condition of having propositional 
knowledge concerning the object. 
Kant’s answer to his question about the possibility of synthetic a priori 
judgements makes use of this division between sensibility and the 
understanding. He claims that each faculty has an a priori element whose 
existence explains the possibility of certain forms of synthetic a priori 
cognition. In the case of sensibility, our sensible representations are all 
structured by the pure forms of intuition, which are space and time. One 
way to understand this is as requiring that anything which is given to us 
through intuition is given to us as either spatially structured (e.g. as having 
extension and location), or as temporally structured (e.g. as having 
duration), or perhaps as both. More specifically, space is the form of outer 
sense and time is the form of inner sense (A19/B33f), where the domain of 
outer sense is the domain of material, extended bodies, and the domain of 
inner sense is successive states of mind. The identification of the pure 
forms of intuition explains the possibility of synthetic, a priori cognition in 
mathematics. 
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The a priori element to the understanding consists of a set of a priori 
concepts – the categories – which comprise the forms of thought. These 
pure concepts are implicated in all acts of judging and their application to 
what is given in intuition is a necessary condition for a certain type of 
cognition (A84/B116f). This raises various problems for Kant, not least 
that of explaining how a pure concept can be legitimately applied to 
something given in intuition – but his explanation of how and why the 
categories can be applied to the objects of intuition is meant to secure our 
synthetic, a priori cognition of scientific and metaphysical truths. 
Sensibility and the understanding are subserved by a faculty of the 
imagination, a less fundamental faculty of ‘intuition even without the 
presence of an object. (An 7:153). In the empirical sphere, this sub-faculty 
has a reproductive function, for example in hallucination and memory. 
But in its ‘transcendental function’ (A124, cf. B152) it mediates between 
sensibility and the understanding, playing a role in the production of 
certain kinds of sensory representations and allowing the understanding to 
apply concepts to that which is given in sensibility. One primary way in 
which it plays this role is through synthesis: that ‘action of putting 
different representations together with each other and comprehending 
their manifoldness in one cognition’ (A77/B103). 
One important question about the relation between sensibility and the 
understanding is whether the understanding is operative in the generation 
of intuitions. This is an issue which divides recent commentary on Kant. 
Kant tells us that ‘[t]he same function that gives unity to the different 
representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of 
different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is 
called the pure concept of understanding’ (A79/B104-5), and that ‘[a]n 
object… is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition 
is united’ (B137). This has been taken to suggest that the understanding is 
operative in the generation of intuitions such that what is given to us in 
intuition is presented in accordance not only with the forms of sensibility 
but also with the forms of thought (Griffith 2012, Longuenesse 1998, 
McDowell 1998). But others have worried that any involvement of the 
understanding in sensibility would blur Kant’s strict division of the 
faculties (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005). 
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These issues concern topics in what we might call the metaphysics of 
mind, issues concerning the nature of the human mind, its features, and its 
characteristics. Kant’s critical philosophy also makes claims about the 
epistemology of mind, that is, about the way in which we know about our 
own mental lives and the role of such knowledge and awareness in our 
cognition of the world. Most basically, and corresponding to the two 
faculties of cognition, Kant distinguishes two ways in which we are aware 
of our own mental states: through inner sense, which is a form of 
sensibility, and through apperception, a capacity grounded in the 
spontaneous activity of the understanding. And in the same way that Kant 
complains that his predecessors failed to recognise the distinction between 
sensibility and the understanding, so too does he complain that ‘systems of 
psychology treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of apperception’ 
(B153; cf. An 7:142). 
Inner sense is the faculty ‘by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its 
inner state… represented in relations of time’ (A22-3/B37). This is the 
notion of an internal sense one finds in Locke (1975 [1689]: 2.1.4, 105) 
and Kant’s use of it in the pre-Critical period treats it as the only form in 
which rational beings can be aware of themselves (e.g. FS 2:60). The 
account of apperception is more complicated. Kant distinguishes it from 
inner sense by use of the distinction between passivity and activity: in 
inner sense ‘we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected’ (B153), 
which is to say passively, in terms of what we undergo. But apperception 
involves an act of spontaneity: the subject is conscious of herself in terms 
of what she does (An 7:161). And this form of awareness cannot be 
reduced to or explained in terms of inner sense. 
The notion of apperception takes centre stage in the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories. Kant focuses there on what he calls the 
‘transcendental unity of apperception’, introduced as the idea that the ‘I 
think must be able to accompany all my representations’ (B132). The 
possibility of the I think accompanying all my representations shows that 
there is a form of consciousness by which we are aware of ourselves as the 
single subject of all our (conscious) mental states. Kant is clear that this 
form of consciousness is not inner sense: it is a non-sensory expression of 
our spontaneous capacities. And it requires, he claims, that my 
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representations be synthesised or combined (A108/B135) in accordance 
with the pure concepts of the understanding (A127/B143). The striking 
result, at least on one reading (Bennett 1966, Strawson 1966, Wolff 
1963), is that the kind of self-consciousness involved in recognising oneself 
as the self-same subject of one’s mental states requires the experience of 
objects as falling under the pure concepts of the understanding. And this 
Kant takes to provide part of the justification for our applying these 
concepts to what is given to us in intuition. 
These claims have puzzled and inspired commentators in equal part. They 
suggest a connection between one form of self-consciousness and our 
awareness of an objective world. For our part, it is enough to note that 
Kant identified a distinctive form of awareness of oneself, one which is at 
least potentially involved in all forms of conscious representation and 
which is an expression of a subject’s spontaneity. 
What kind of knowledge can we gain through exercising these forms of 
self-awareness and what are the limits of such knowledge? This is the focus 
of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason section of the first Critique 
(A341/B399f). Kant’s target is rational psychology, of which he numbers 
Descartes and Mendelssohn as a proponents. Rational psychology claims 
to found substantive metaphysical knowledge about the self solely on the 
basis of the “I think”, which is to say, solely on the basis of apperception 
(A343/B401). In particular, the rational psychologist claims to know that 
the self is a substance, simple, numerically identical over time, and known 
independently of possible objects in space solely through consideration of 
the “I think”. Kant objects that the rational psychologist’s arguments for 
each of these claims involve an equivocation which renders each argument 
invalid. 
Some themes permeate the discussion. First, the rational psychologist 
mistakenly moves from considerations about the logical subject to claims 
about the self as it really is. Second, we have no intuitive awareness of the 
self as it really is, either in inner sense or in apperception. And third, our 
cognition of ourselves is no more special or secure than our cognition of 
things outside us. Some of these claims turn on the distinction between 
appearances and things as they are in themselves which is the centrepiece 
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of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Inner sense, for instance, cannot present 
us with the self as it is in itself because it is a form of sensibility and as a 
form of sensibility it presents us only with appearances (A278, B153). The 
case of apperception is more complex. Certainly it does not allow us 
intuitive awareness of the self as it is in itself – the noumenal self – because 
apperception is not a form of sensible awareness at all (A107). But whilst 
many have taken it that our apperceptive awareness of ourselves as purely 
‘logical subject[s] of thinking’ (A350) rules out any awareness of the 
noumenal self (Allison 2004, Ameriks 2000 [1982]: 239, Kitcher 1990: 
181-204), some have held it to be compatible with some form of non-
intuitive, immediate awareness of one’s noumenal self (Brook 1994: 246-
52, Wuerth 2014: 115-186). 
The effect of the discussion of the Paralogisms is to append to the 
discussion of the ways in which we know ourselves in the first part of the 
Critique an account of the limits of such knowledge. Inner sense allows us 
knowledge only of how we appear and apperception cannot be used to 
derive the conclusions about the self proffered by rational psychology. 
Kant’s account of the source and limits of knowledge includes an account 
of the source and limits of our knowledge of the self. 
To summarise: Kant’s general picture of the cognitive subject is one on 
which the human cognitive mind has two distinct faculties, each of which 
has their own a priori element and which together allow cognition of 
objects. Corresponding to each faculty is a mode of awareness by which 
subjects come to know about aspects of the mind. This picture undergirds 
Kant’s explanation of synthetic a priori cognition in mathematics, natural 
science, and metaphysics. And it sets a limit on the kind of knowledge we 
can gain about the self.3 
 
 
3 Discussions of Kant’s cognitive subject can be found in (Brook 1994, Kitcher 1990, 
2011, Klemme 1996, Melnick 2009, Mohr 1991, Powell 1990, Sturma 1985, Waxman 
1991, 2014, Wuerth 2014). Discussions of Kant’s attack on rational psychology include 
(Ameriks 2000 [1982], Dyck 2014, Rosefeldt 2000). Kant’s distinction between two 
forms of self-awareness and its relation to passivity and activity has been influential in 
debates about the nature of our self-knowledge. See for instance (Boyle 2009, Moran 
2001). 
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Other Issues in the Philosophy of Mind 
Alongside this account of the nature of the human mind and its forms of 
awareness, the theoretical philosophy contains discussion of many other 
issues in the philosophy of mind. I mention a few in what follows. 
Spatial and Temporal Experience: we have seen that Kant held that space 
and time play a privileged role in our sensible awareness of objects as pure 
forms of sensibility, structuring everything that is given to us in outer and 
inner sense respectively. This discussion raises a set of issues about the 
spatial and temporal character of human experience. What role does the 
perception of space and time play in our perception of outer objects? And 
what role do our concepts of space and time play in our conception of 
outer objects as capable of existing independently of us? Issues to do with 
the first question arise in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the first 
Critique (A19/B33f). In the first metaphysical exposition of the concept of 
space, for instance, Kant looks to claim that it is a necessary condition on 
perceiving an object as spatially related that we perceive it as spatially 
located (A23-4/B38-9). This spatial location requirement looks plausible, 
but there are questions about whether it is challenged by empirical 
discoveries into the psychopathologies of visual perception and about 
whether Kant is right to think that the status of his claim can be 
established by a priori methods.4 
The second question raises issues about our conceptions of space and time 
and their relation to our conception of objects as capable of existing 
independently of our experience of them. Kant argues in the Amphiboly of 
the Concepts of Reflection section of the first Critique against the 
Leibnizian claim that objects are individuated by complete concepts 
(A260-292/B316-349). Kant’s complaint is that such a view entails the 
numerical identity of qualitatively identical particulars and thus that we 
cannot have cognition of such distinct particulars without sensible 
intuition (A263-4/B319-320). Similar considerations are raised in the 
Lectures on Logic where he denies the existence of a ‘lowest concept’, one 
 
4 See (Warren 1998) for a reading of the first metaphysical exposition, and (Schwenkler 
2012) for a discussion of some of the relations between Kant’s discussion and 
contemporary empirical work. 
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which was completely determined and allowed a subject to refer to an 
individual (JL 9:97-100). This insistence on intuition for individuation 
might be thought to entail a special status for space and time in our 
reference to individuals which exist independently of our awareness of 
them.5 
Concepts and Experience: I noted above that Kant’s division between 
sensibility and the understanding raises a range of questions about whether 
the understanding is constitutively involved in the generation of intuitions. 
This has prompted a debate in the secondary literature as to whether Kant 
was a conceptualist or nonconceptualist about perception.6 This is often 
phrased as a debate over whether Kant holds that concepts are necessary 
for perceiving outer particulars. There are various ways in which this 
characterisation needs finessing. First, Kant distinguishes between 
intuition [Anschauung] and perception [Wahrnehmung], where the latter is 
something like an intuition of which one is conscious (Prol. 4:300) and we 
need be clear that the debate in Kant is a debate about the status of 
intuitions.7 Second, it is more helpful to focus on the dependence relations 
that exist between intuitions and acts of the understanding, rather than on 
the necessary involvement of concepts in intuiting. Partly this is so as to 
include in the debate those who think that there are acts of the 
understanding which don’t involve the exercise of concepts and partly to 
recognise that modal claims about necessary status are entailed by but 
don’t entail claims about dependence relations.8  
Considerations which have been raised in support of the claim that 
intuitions are constitutively independent of the understanding include 
Kant’s insistence on the irreducibility of sensibility and the understanding; 
his account of animal perceptual consciousness; his seeming 
acknowledgement of the possibility of intuitions offering objects to 
 
5 The most famous discussion of these issues is in (Evans 1980, Strawson 1959, 1966). 
6 See (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005) for statements of nonconceptualism and (Ginsborg 
2008, Griffith 2012) for conceptualist replies. 
7 See (Grüne 2009, McLear 2014, 2015, Tolley 2013). In this way, the debate about 
whether Kant is a conceptualist or a nonconceptualist has become detached from the 
discussion of conceptualism and nonconceptualism in the philosophy of perception 
literature, unlike, for example, the original discussion in (Hanna 2005). 
8 On the former see (Land 2006); on the latter see (Gomes forthcoming). (McLear 2014, 
2015) helpfully and accurately characterise the debate in terms of dependence relations. 
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intuition without the functions of thinking (A90-1/B123). Considerations 
raised against include the role of synthesis in the generation of intuitions 
and the nature and structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the 
Categories.9 This discussion has implications for contemporary debates 
about the involvement of concepts in perceptual experience and our 
relation to non-concept-using animals. 
Self-Consciousness: we saw that Kant distinguishes two different ways in 
which we can be aware of ourselves, through inner sense and through pure 
apperception. How are we presented to ourselves in these forms of 
awareness, and what are the epistemic features of each form of awareness? 
Some have seen in Kant’s discussion the first recognition of the distinction 
between being conscious of oneself as an object and being conscious of 
oneself as a subject (e.g. An 7:135), a distinction which features centrally 
in later German idealism and, later still, in Wittgenstein’s discussion of 
these issues.10 Kant clearly rejects the view that in being aware of ourselves 
as a subject of thought and experience, we are thereby perceptually 
tracking some substance in which our thoughts and experiences inhere. 
This leaves open a variety of positions one might take on the nature of the 
subject of which one is aware in pure apperception, from it being the 
noumenal self as substance to something purely logical. And one’s view on 
this issue will have implications for the question of whether this form of 
awareness brings with it any epistemic security or immunity to error. 
Mind and Matter: contemporary philosophy of mind often takes the 
metaphysics of mind to exhaust the philosophy of mind, and even within 
the metaphysics of mind the focus is almost exclusively on the relation of 
the mental and the physical. We have seen above that Kant’s discussion of 
the mind quite properly takes the philosophy of mind to extend well 
beyond this question. But it does include an account of the relation 
between mind and matter, as set out most centrally in the Paralogisms of 
Pure Reason. Kant’s account rests on his transcendental idealist distinction 
 
9 See (Allais 2009, Hanna 2005, McLear 2011, 2015) for instances of these arguments in 
support of nonconceptualism; see (Gomes 2014, Griffith 2012) on the arguments 
against. (McLear 2014) provides a helpful overview of the debate. 
10 See (Franks 2005: 304-313, Henrich 1971, 1982) for discussions of Fichte’s work and 
its relation to Kant in this context, and (Evans 1982, Shoemaker 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 
Wittgenstein 1991) for influential twentieth-century presentations of the issue.  
13 
between appearances and things in themselves (A391). If one thinks of 
both mind and matter as things in themselves, Kant claims, then there is a 
problem in accounting for their relation, since matter would be composite 
in itself whilst the soul would be simple. But once we recognise that matter 
is merely an outer appearance, then there is no obstacle to taking the 
noumenal substance which grounds the appearance of matter to be of the 
same kind as the noumenal substance which grounds the mental (A359-
60, B427-8). 
This claim can be read as recommending humility about the nature of 
mind and matter, and so preventing foreclosure of mind and body 
interacting. Or one might take it in a more metaphysically loaded way as 
identifying a ground for both mind and matter which is itself homogenous 
and thus capable of grounding interaction (and is also, perhaps, neither 
mental nor material). Either way, it is clear that Kant took his 
transcendental idealism to dispose of the problem of mind and matter 
relations.11 
Assent and Epistemic Grounds: at the end of the first Critique, in the Canon 
of Pure Reason, Kant discusses different species of Fürwahrhalten – that is 
‘holding-for-true’ or assent. This discussion contains the most 
straightforward Kantian analogues of topics in contemporary epistemology 
and it has been the subject of a number of recent studies.12 It also raises 
issues that relate to the philosophy of mind. Here are two. First, what is 
the relation of cognition to assent, and in particular to that species of 
assent which Kant calls ‘knowledge’ [Wissen]? The different forms of assent 
are marked, in part, by the kind of sufficiency they possess. Kant says in 
the Lectures on Logic that knowledge must be ‘based on a ground of 
cognition that is objectively as well as subjectively sufficient’ (JL 9:70). But 
he also seems to allow some knowledge which is not based on cognition 
 
11 On this aspect of Kant’s discussion, see (Ameriks 2000 [1982]: ch.3, Powell 1990: 
ch.5). Colin McGinn defends the position that our cognitive limitations prevent us from 
understanding how mind and matter relate. See (McGinn 1991: 81-85) for the 
comparison of his view with Kant, and (Ameriks 2000: 313-319) for discussion of the 
relation. Thomas Nagel (2000: 443-444) also compares his more modest scepticism with 
Kant. And more recently, Derk Pereboom’s discussion of the relation between mind and 
matter (Pereboom 2011) draws on Kant’s views about our ignorance of things in 
themselves in assessing the prospects for physicalism. 
12 For instance, (Chignell 2007a, 2007b, Pasternack 2014, Stevenson 2003). 
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(Chignell 2014: 576-579). Does it follow from these characterisations that 
cognition and knowledge are different kinds of mental states, and if so, 
does it follow that cognition and knowledge take different objects? 
Second, what role does the will play in the formation and sustenance of 
assents? Kant raises this question in his Lectures on Logic (JL 9:73), holding 
both that the will has no direct influence on assent (JL 9:74) but also that 
we can be blamed for giving approval to false cognitions (BL 24:160) and 
that when ‘an appearance is given to us, we are still completely free as to 
how we want to judge things from it’ (Prol. 4:290). Answering this 
question requires us to think about whether the formation of empirical 
assent involves the exercise of genuine agency and the ways in which our 
assent forming procedures are subject to the influence of the will. And it 
bears on an account of perceptual error since Kant holds that the 
possibility of perceptual error requires judgement: the senses cannot err 
because they do not judge at all (A293-4/B350, BL 24:83, JL 9:53, VL 
24:825).13 
Feeling & Desire: although the first Critique focuses almost exclusively on 
sensibility and the understanding – which we can group together as 
comprising the faculty for cognition – Kant also distinguishes a faculty of 
feeling and a faculty of desire which come to the fore in the second and 
third critiques (CPrR 5:9n). Kant’s reason for distinguishing these faculties 
is that he thinks the representations involved in each cannot be reduced to 
the others: pleasure and displeasure, representations of the faculty of 
desire, are not types of cognition nor forms of desire (CPJ 5:189, 5:206); 
and desires are neither cognitions nor feelings (CPrR 5:9n). Although none 
of these faculties can be reduced to another, the faculty for cognition is 
fundamental amongst the three because the faculties of feeling and desire 
depend on the faculty of cognition and not vice versa. Cognition presents 
us with objects which can give rise to feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
and correspondingly the desire to acquire or shun the object. The 
 
13 Recent discussion of these issues include (Chignell 2007b, Cohen 2013, 2014b, Kohl 
2015, McLear forthcoming, Stephenson 2011). 
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interrelation of these faculties is of especial importance in the practical 
philosophy.14 
Human Action: discussions of Kant’s theory of action tend to take place in 
the context of his practical philosophy, but Kant also has an account of 
human empirical action, one which draws on his account of the three 
faculties distinguished above. In broad terms, Kant thinks that all actions 
are caused by desires, where desires themselves arise from certain feelings 
of pleasure caused by instances of cognition. The most important part of 
this story is that it is wholly deterministic: ‘all the actions of a human 
being are determined in accord with the order of nature… and if we could 
investigate all the appearances of his power of choice down to their basis, 
then there would be no human action we could not predict with certainty’ 
(A549/B577, cf. A554-5/B582-3). There are a range of interesting 
questions about how this account of human empirical action is to be 
squared with the more familiar Kantian account of human transcendental 
freedom. And there are interesting contrasts with contemporary accounts 
of human action which take it that only one or two forms of 
representation are required to explain human empirical action, as opposed 
to Kant’s requirement of the involvement of three irreducibly distinct 
states.15 
Empirical Psychology: continuing on the same theme, Kant’s lectures and 
published work in anthropology and metaphysics contain significant 
discussion of empirical psychology more generally. Empirical psychology 
concerns human beings as they are subject to empirical, causal laws, some 
of which concern the workings of the human mind. Although Kant holds 
that knowledge of such laws cannot amount to a proper science in virtue 
of falling short of strict universality (MFNS 4:471), this is nevertheless 
compatible with our pursuing empirically grounded investigation into the 
structure and workings of the human mind in its empirical setting. Kant’s 
discussion includes reflection on: the nature of the five senses, including 
phenomenological and epistemological reflection on their individuation; 
 
14 See (Wuerth 2014: ch.6) for a comprehensive map of these different faculties, their 
subfaculties, and their interrelations. 
15 See (Frierson 2005, 2014, McCarty 2009) for discussions of Kant’s empirical account 
of human action. Christine Korsgaard (2008, 2009) and David Velleman (2000, 2006) 
each provide accounts of the nature of action which draw on Kant’s discussion. 
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the structure of the imagination and its role in various forms of human 
cognition; mental illness, its causes and treatment; the nature of 
temperament and character; and much else related to the mind.16 
This is a small subset of the issues in the philosophy of mind that Kant 
considers in his writings. And the importance and variety of Kant’s 
discussions should come as no surprise. At the end of the first Critique, 
Kant writes that the central concerns of humanity can be summarised in 
three questions: 1) What can I know? 2) What ought I to do? and 3) What 
may I hope? (A805/B833). In his Lectures on Logic, he adds a fourth 
question which he takes to contain the others: 4) What is man? (JL 9:25, 
cf. C 11:429). These writings in the philosophy of mind take on this 
question of who we are. And the resulting discussion is pursued with the 
intellectual ferocity and fecundity of thought that characterise Kant’s 
critical philosophy. Kant’s primary interests may be epistemological, 
metaphysical and practical, but his intellectual projects involve extended 
reflection in the philosophy of mind, reflection which takes us to the heart 
of his philosophical endeavours. 
II. Kant and the Mind in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy 
I turn now to the reception of Kant’s views on the mind in twentieth-
century analytic philosophy. Textbook histories of analytic philosophy 
often trace its founding back to the rejection of neo-Hegelian idealism by 
Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in Cambridge at the start of the 
twentieth-century.17 This rejection also involved a self-conscious rejection 
of Kantian idealism, a rejection which would character the reception of 
Kant’s writings on the philosophy of mind in twentieth-century analytic 
philosophy. This section charts some aspects of that reception.18 
There are multiple strands in the Cantabrigian rebellion against British 
idealism but Moore’s move from idealism to realism is particularly 
 
16 See (Frierson 2009a, 2009b, 2014) and the essays in (Cohen 2014a). 
17 See e.g. (Hylton 1990). 
18 See (Coffa 1991, Hanna 2001) for more general accounts of the reception of Kant’s 
work in twentieth-century philosophy, and (Gomes forthcoming) for a more specific 
discussion of Kant and early twentieth-century philosophy of perception. 
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central. 19  This transition involved sustained engagement with Kant’s 
writings. The most perspicuous evidence of this engagement is in the 1897 
and 1898 dissertations which Moore submitted for the Trinity College 
Prize Fellowship examinations, recently published as (Moore 2011). Both 
dissertations were on the topic of Kant’s ethics, though as Moore notes in 
his intellectual autobiography (1942: 21), the 1898 dissertation is actually 
concerned with issues that arise out of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Together they provide an insight into the intellectual development which 
would lead Moore to his ‘The Nature of Judgement’, published in 1899 
and extracted wholesale from the 1898 dissertation. This is the paper that 
Russell later called the ‘first published account of the new philosophy’ and 
‘conclusive proof of philosophical genius’.20 And it led the way to the full 
rejection of idealism in Moore’s famous 1903 paper ‘The Refutation of 
Idealism’, the title of which contains an ironic allusion to Kant. 
Moore’s central objection to Kant, developed in different ways against 
Kant’s ethics, his account of a priori truth, and his views on the perception 
of objects, is that Kant ‘betrays the too psychological standpoint above 
which he seems never to have risen in treating epistemological questions’ 
(Moore 2011, 1897 dissertation: 62). This is to say, Moore takes Kant as 
having confused questions about how we are psychologically conditioned 
to think, perceive, and will with questions about how things are and how 
things ought to be. In making these criticisms, Moore reads Kant as 
holding that the psychological activity of the subject literally constitutes 
the non-psychological domain in question. And he thus rejects Kant’s 
account of the mind and its functions in service of the new realism.21 
 
19 Russell himself tends to emphasise the contributions of Moore, both in this period, for 
instance in the preface to his The Principles of Mathematics (‘On fundamental questions of 
philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr. G.E. Moore’), and 
later, as in his autobiography (‘Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his 
footsteps’). (Cartwright 2003) has a nice discussion of the relations between Russell and 
Moore over this period, including consideration of the question of whether these 
statements overstate the influence of Moore on Russell. 
20 From Russell’s obituary for Moore, published in The Times, 28 October 1958, 
referenced in (Moore 2011: xxxiv). 
21 (Baldwin 1990: 7-20) and (Moore 2011: xlvi-lxvii) contain excellent accounts and 
discussions of Moore’s criticisms of Kant. 
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Contemporaneous with the Cantabrigian rebellion against British idealism 
was an Oxonian rebellion led by John Cook Wilson and H.A. Prichard, 
amongst others. This Oxford Realism also involved a rejection of key 
British idealist theses, but the rejection was developed in ways which 
importantly differed from that of Moore and Russell. Oxford Realism 
faded somewhat from view in the second half of the twentieth-century, 
but recent scholarship has begun the process of bringing it back into focus, 
a development which is especially interesting given the Oxford Realist 
commitment to certain theses – e.g. that knowledge is a mental state; that 
perceptual experience involves primitive non-representational relations of 
apprehension – which have re-emerged in recent debates. This Oxonian 
rejection of idealism was formed explicitly through rejection of Kant’s 
views, so much so that A.S.L. Farquaharson, in his memoir of Cook 
Wilson, goes as far as to trace the origins of the Oxford Realism back to 
questions posed by a student during Cook Wilson’s lectures on Kant 
(Cook Wilson 1926: xix).22 
The clearest exposition of the Oxford Realist opposition to Kant occurs in 
H.A. Prichard’s 1909 book Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, summed up by 
one reviewer as ‘not so much a serious study of Kant as a work using Kant 
as a stalking-horse in an argument for independent philosophical 
conclusions’ (Walsh 1981: 732). As with Moore, Prichard takes it to 
follow from Kant’s account of the human cognitive mind that the objects 
of perception and knowledge are constituted by a subject’s mental activity. 
This is because knowledge, for Kant, ‘consists in an activity of the mind by 
which it combines the manifold of sense on certain principles... and by 
which it thereby gives the manifold relation to an object’ (Prichard 1909: 
230). Prichard takes this to entail various idealist claims about the objects 
which are presented to the mind, and he rejects these claims as 
incompatible with a straightforward realism about the objects of 
knowledge and perception. As in Cambridge, Kant’s account of the mind 
is rejected as incompatible with realism.23 
 
22 Useful accounts of Oxford Realism include (Kalderon and Travis 2013, Marion 2000a, 
2000b). 
23 Prichard’s reading of Kant is criticised in (Bird 1962: 2-17). See (Gomes forthcoming) 
for more on the relation between Kant and this aspect of early analytic philosophy. Note 
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It is not obvious how successful the criticisms of these Cambridge and 
Oxford realists are, even when viewed on their own terms. But they were 
very influential in setting the terms by which Kant’s work on the nature of 
the mind was taken up and responded to in the development of analytic 
philosophy and their readings would colour reactions to Kant’s account of 
the mind in the twentieth-century. 
There were other ways in which Kant’s views on the nature of the mind 
passed into twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Kant’s views on the 
synthetic a priori and mathematics were an important spur to Frege’s work 
in the development of logic and to the extent that this work involved a 
consideration of the degree to which mathematics and logic could be 
undertaken without appeal to the deliverances of sensibility, it thereby 
involved consideration of Kant’s account of mind. Another notable source, 
particularly in the United States of America, was C.I. Lewis’s reading of 
Kant, a reading forged not in the context of British idealism but that of 
American pragmatism. His 1929 book Mind and the World-order exhibits a 
number of Kantian themes and Lewis’s course on the first Critique 
instructed and influenced a generation of Harvard students.24 
Of the many philosophers of mind in the twentieth-century who 
continued to take inspiration from Kant’s writings, two stand out: P.F. 
Strawson and Wilfrid Sellars. Both were influenced heavily by Kant’s 
writings and, more importantly, disseminated that influence throughout 
analytic philosophy of mind. It was through their work and the work of 
their students that Kantian ideas remained part of the philosophy of mind. 
Strawson’s introduction to Kant arose out of the historical peculiarities of 
Oxford’s degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics which was 
structured, in Strawson’s day, such that there were two special subjects 
 
that both Oxford and Cambridge were much less insular than is sometimes suggested in 
histories of early analytic philosophy and the influence of German writers is particularly 
important. Cook Wilson studied with Lotze in Göttingen around 1873–4, Moore 
studied in Tübingen in 1895, and both Moore and Russell engaged closely with the work 
of many German psychologists, philosophers and mathematicians. See (Bell 1999) for a 
discussion of the German influence on Russell and Moore. 
24 Robert Paul Wolff has a series of lovely descriptions of Lewis’s Kant course in his 
memoir A Life in the Academy (Wolff 2013). 
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which those who wished to specialise in philosophy were obliged to take: 
Logic and Kant, the latter to be studied through the Critique of Pure 
Reason and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In the Critique of 
Pure Reason, Strawson found ‘a depth, a range, a boldness, and a power 
unlike anything I had previously encountered’ (Strawson 2003: 8). The 
influence of Strawson’s engagement with Kant can be seen in his 
pioneering study in descriptive metaphysics, Individuals (1959), a work 
‘subtly and in part consciously influenced by [the first Critique]’ (Strawson 
2003: 8). But it is his ground-breaking and influential commentary on the 
Critique of Pure Reason, The Bounds of Sense (1966), which demonstrated 
the importance of Kantian ideas for contemporary philosophical 
discussions and, in Hilary Putnam’s words, ‘opened the way to a reception 
of Kant’s philosophy by analytic philosophers’ (Putnam 1998: 273). 
Strawson’s central approach to the first Critique is captured by his 
characteristically elegant title, a title which encodes a three-fold pun. First, 
it is an echo of a title that Kant considered for the Critique.25 Second and 
third, it plays on the ambiguity of the word ‘sense’ which can denote both 
sense-experience and sense-meaning. The title, Strawson tells us in his 
Preface, thus ‘alludes compendiously to the three main strands in [Kant’s] 
thought’. First, Kant sets a lower limit on sense, arguing that ‘a certain 
minimal structure is essential to any conception of experience which we 
can make truly intelligible to ourselves’ (1966: 11). Second, he sets an 
upper limit on sense, holding ‘that the attempt to extend beyond the limits 
of experience the use of structural concepts, or of any other concepts, leads 
only to claims empty of meaning’. Finally, he does all of this from ‘a point 
outside [the bounds of sense], a point which, if they are rightly drawn, 
cannot exist’ (1966: 12). This point outside the bounds of sense is Kant’s 
metaphysics of transcendental idealism and the ‘imaginary subject of 
transcendental psychology’ (1966: 32). Strawson’s analytic project is to 
 
25 In a letter to Marcus Herz from 1771, Kant writes ‘I am therefore now busy on a work 
which I call “The Bounds of Sensibility and of Reason”’ (C 10:123); he repeats the title in  
a letter to Herz from 1772, writing of a work ‘which might perhaps have the title, The 
[Bounds] of Sensibility and Reason’ (C 10:129). Zweig’s translation renders the second title 
as The Limits of Sensibility and Reason, but both titles use the same German term, 
Grenzen. 
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extract what is valuable of the first two strands from what he supposed to 
be the incoherence of the last.26 
Strawson’s crisp prose, philosophical insight and sheer intellectual 
achievement prompted a resurgence of interest in Kantian claims in 
theoretical philosophy. Three particular claims stand out. First, that there 
is a close link between our capacity to think of objective particulars and 
our capacity to think or perceive in spatiotemporal terms. Second, that 
there is a link between consciousness and self-consciousness, between our 
awareness of the objective world and our self-conscious conception of that 
world as objective. Third, that the limits of sense-experience set the limits 
on sense-meaning and that this shows the unintelligibility of Cartesian 
Dualism. These three claims came out of Strawson’s reading of the 
Aesthetic, the Analytic and the Dialectic respectively and they set the 
framework for the way in which a group of philosophers, most notably 
many of Strawson’s students, encountered and debated these issues. In this 
way, Strawson’s engagement with Kant set the topics and character for one 
set of issues which achieved prominence in twentieth-century philosophy 
of mind.27 
Sellars’s rich training in philosophy included time spent in Paris, at the 
University of Michigan and at the University of Buffalo, but one 
particularly formative period was his degree in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics at Oxford where Sellars was a Rhodes Scholar.28 This brought 
Sellars into contact with the Oxford Realists whose ideas 
struck me with truly revolutionary force… I can say in all seriousness 
that twenty years ago I regarded Wilson’s Statement and Inference as the 
philosophical book of the century, and Prichard's lectures on 
 
26 See (Glock 2003) for further discussion of Strawson’s work. 
27 Some of the philosophers of mind influenced, and in many cases taught, by Strawson 
include, Gareth Evans, John McDowell, Paul Snowdon, Quassim Cassam, John 
Campbell. The Kantian background is evident in, for instance, (Cassam 1997, Evans 
1980, McDowell 1994), but a more general sense of the Strawsonian character of this 
part of the philosophy of mind can be seen in the essays collected in (Bermudez et al. 
1995, Eilan et al. 1993, Roessler et al. 2011). 
28 Sellars arrived at Oriel College, Oxford in 1934; he completed the PPE degree in 1936 
and began work on a DPhil, before leaving to enroll on the Harvard PhD programme in 
autumn 1937 – just as a 17-year old Strawson began his PPE degree at St John’s College, 
Oxford. 
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perception and on moral philosophy… as veritable models of 
exposition and analysis. I may add that while my philosophical ideas 
have undergone considerable changes since 1935, I still think that some 
of the best philosophical thinking of the past hundred years was done 
by these two men (Wilfrid Sellars 1957: 458). 
But Sellars was already developing his own philosophical system and, as he 
put it, ‘[t]he influence of Kant was to play a decisive role’ (Wilfrid Sellars 
1975: 284). 
Sellars studied the Critique with H.H. Price, and came to believe that ‘by 
denying that sense impressions, however indispensable to cognition, were 
themselves cognitive, Kant made a radical break with all his predecessors, 
empiricists and rationalists alike. The ‘of-ness’ of sensation simply isn’t the 
‘of-ness’ of even the most rudimentary thought’ (Wilfrid Sellars 1975: 
285). This Kantian background runs throughout Sellars writings, and is 
evident in his two most important works, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind’ (1956) and his John Locke lectures, given at Oxford in 1966 and 
later published as Science and Metaphysics, with the subtitle Variations on 
Kantian Themes (1968). Both involve a commitment to the distinction 
between sense and thought and an investigation into the question of how 
the former can be brought to bear on the latter. In this, and in many of 
their details, they are grounded in Kant’s presentation of the problem of 
the first Critique. 
Sellars’s influence on twentieth-century philosophy of mind is a little more 
circuitous. Although his work was influential amongst his contemporaries, 
it was the engagement of Richard Rorty, John McDowell, Ruth Millikan, 
Robert Brandom, and others at the end of the twentieth-century which 
revitalised interest in Sellars. Many of the ideas which these philosophers 
take from Sellars were first presented in Sellars as Kantian insights. These 
include the claims that states of knowing and believing fall within a logical 
space of reasons; that it is a myth to think that a piece of experiential 
sense-data can play a normative role; that the content of a concept has an 
essential connection to that concept’s inferential role. These claims are said 
to be elucidations of Kant’s thoughts about the nature of judgement, its 
connection to spontaneity, and his conception of concepts as rules. A 
further Kantian theme is Sellars’s twist on transcendental idealism which 
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lines up the distinction between appearances and things in themselves with 
Sellars’s own famous distinction between the manifest and scientific 
images of the world. In this way and through the work of these 
philosophers, Sellars’s reading of Kant influenced one prominent part of 
contemporary philosophy of mind.29 
This influence of Strawson and Sellars can be charted in two different 
ways. The first is their influence – particularly Strawson’s – on the 
interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. A number of important studies 
followed Strawson in attending to the account of the mind set out in 
Kant’s project, but did so with greater fidelity and sensitivity to Kant’s 
texts. Three notable examples include Karl Amerik’s Kant’s Theory of Mind 
(2000 [1982]), Patricia Kitcher’s Kant’s Transcendental Psychology (1990) 
and Andrew Brook’s Kant and the Mind (1994). 
The second is their influence on the philosophy of mind. There developed 
in the later part of the twentieth-century, a distinctively Kantian take on 
issues in the contemporary philosophy of mind where this Kantian take 
was grounded in engagement with Strawson’s and Sellars’s writings. This 
Kantian approach to the philosophy of mind didn’t and doesn’t consist in 
any agreed set of theses. It involves rather a shared understanding of the 
relevant problems and a common tradition of interlocutors who are 
engaged with in addressing those problems. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that there are some very general themes which can be identified. I will 
mention three: a necessary structure to thought and experience; a link 
between some forms of consciousness and self-consciousness; the rejection 
of a Cartesian Self. Some of those I intend to classify may demur from the 
characterisation but I hope the package of views is recognisable in broad 
outline. 
A Necessary Structure: the first is a sympathy towards the claim that there is 
some necessary structure to our experience and thought about the world. 
This claim can be cashed out in different ways, depending on whether one 
focuses on the structure of experience or the structure of thought, and 
 
29 Some of those philosophers of mind influenced by Sellars include Paul Churchland, 
Richard Rorty, Robert Brandom, Ruth Millikan and John McDowell. See (Brandom 
2015, DeVries 2009, Rosenberg 2007) for further discussion. 
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depending on whether one focuses on the role that space and time play in 
structuring our experience and thought or whether one focuses on the role 
played by certain categorial concepts such as those of substance and cause. 
Focusing first on experience, a number of those influenced by Strawson 
and Sellars take up the question of whether the perception of space and 
time is required to perceptually individuate particulars (Campbell 2007, 
Cassam 2007: 85-128, Schwenkler 2012). This discussion is often 
grounded in Strawson’s take on this question in the masterful first chapter 
of Individuals, but it bears obvious relations to Kant’s discussion of the 
pure forms of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic and his criticism 
of Leibniz in the Amphiboly of the Concepts of Reflection. 
The claim that the perception of space and time play some privileged role 
in our experience of the world needs distinguishing from the claim that 
our concepts of space and time play some privileged role in our thinking 
about the world (as being mind-independent, say). Strawson doesn’t 
always make this distinction clear and Tyler Burge has claimed that this 
illustrates a general failing in Kantian philosophy of mind – thought not, 
he thinks of Kant’s philosophy of mind (Burge 2010: 154-156) – namely 
that of conflating conditions on our objectively representing the world 
with the conditions for our representing the world as objective (Burge 
2010: ch.4). Whether or not Burge is right to think of this as a conflation, 
it is true that the claims are distinct and that both have featured in 
contemporary Kantian discussions. 
A related claim concerns the question of whether there are a certain set of 
privileged concepts that we must use in thinking about the world. This 
idea takes a number of different forms. In Evans, for instance, one finds 
the claim that our grasp of the world as objective requires our possessing a 
theory of primitive mechanics underlying the concept of a material object 
(Evans 1980), a claim which echoes Kant’s thought that the categories 
collectively constitute the concept of an object in general (A93/B125). In 
Sellars and Brandom the claim is given metaliguistic form: there are certain 
non-descriptive concepts which characterise a metalinguistic vocabulary for 
formulating the rules governing the use of descriptive concepts (Brandom 
2015: ch.1, Wilfrid Sellars 1974). This metalinguistic vocabulary sets a 
categorial structure on our thinking about the world. 
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Self-Consciousness and Normativity: the conflation Burge finds in the slide 
between identifying the conditions on representing an objective world and 
identifying the conditions on representing the world as objective might be 
thought to be an instance of a more general identification of, if not yet a 
conflation between, certain forms of conscious state and a subject’s 
awareness that she is in that conscious state. This suggestive identification 
takes a number of different forms. Evans holds that ‘nothing that the 
subject can do, or can imagine, will entitle us to attribute [an objective 
spatial representation] to him if he cannot make sense of the idea that he 
might be at one of the points representable within his cognitive map’ 
(Evans 1982: 163) and McDowell holds that experience must be 
‘intelligible to its subject as purporting to be awareness of a feature of 
objective reality: as a seeming glimpse of the world’ (McDowell 1994: 54). 
These claims place a close link between certain forms of consciousness and 
self-consciousness, and the development of such a link has featured 
centrally in the recent work of John McDowell and Sebastian Rödl 
(McDowell 2011, Rödl 2007). It can be seen as an attempt to make sense 
of Kant’s puzzling claim that the “I think” must be able to accompany all 
my representations (B132). 
Amongst those influenced by Sellars, this thought is sometimes said to 
follow from a prior commitment to the normativity of thought on the 
grounds that it is only self-conscious states which provide normative 
reasons for action and belief. That thinking is ‘fraught with ought’ is a 
central part of Sellars’s view, captured in his now-famous comment that 
‘in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing… we are placing 
it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to 
justify what one says’ (Wilfrid Sellars 1956: §36). Sellars saw this 
commitment as derived from Kant’s views about the spontaneity of 
thought and the autonomous nature of judging subjects, and many of 
those influenced by Sellars take this to be the central lesson for a Kant 
influenced philosophy of mind (Brandom 2002). The claim is much less 
prominent, perhaps even absent, in the work of Strawson and his students. 
The Rejection of a Cartesian Self: a final theme concerns the rejection of the 
Cartesian Self, a lesson which both Strawson and Sellars took from Kant’s 
discussion in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. This isn’t a distinctively 
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Kantian theme, since many in the middle part of the twentieth-century 
rejected the postulation of an immaterial thinking substance, sometimes 
for reasons stemming from logical positivism, sometimes for reasons 
connected to a growing commitment to scientific naturalism. 
Nevertheless, the Kantian discussions of this topic seem to me to involve 
two distinctive characteristics. First, the rejection of the Cartesian Self 
often proceeds on non-empirical grounds: the claim is not that Cartesian 
Dualism is evidentially unlikely, given certain empirical claims, but that 
there is some deeper, perhaps conceptual, problem with the view (Wifrid 
Sellars 1970, Strawson 1974). This seems to me aligned to Kant’s own 
reasons for rejecting the conclusions of rational psychology, namely that 
they are not just shown to be empirically false on grounds of not according 
with the empirical evidence but are rather necessarily false given the 
account of cognition set out in the first part of the first Critique. Second, 
there is considerable sympathy for Kant’s diagnosis of why the rational 
psychologist’s arguments seem so seductive, a diagnosis which turns on a 
mistaken inference from the structure of first-person thought and 
experience (Cassam 1989, McDowell 1997, Strawson 1966). 
These are some of the themes which seem to me to characterise Kantian 
approaches to the philosophy of mind. In temperament and position they 
often stand opposed to a certain kind of reductive naturalism which can 
dominate debates about the nature of the mental. For both Strawson and 
Sellars, the importance of Kant’s work on the philosophy of mind is that it 
offers us an alternative to the various empiricist and Cartesian models of 
the mind which they took to dominate philosophical discussion. And one 
reason for the continued engagement with their views is that they took this 
alternative to either be dissociable from the strange metaphysics of 
transcendental idealism (Strawson) or made compatible with scientific 
realism about the external world (Sellars). It thus seemed like the realism 
of Moore and Russell could be made compatible with Kantian views about 
the nature of the mind. 
This brings us full circle. For one recent theme in Kant discussions has 
been the question of whether Strawson and Sellars were right to think that 
Kant’s insights can be sanitised and made independent of his idealism. In 
Kant studies there has a been a resurgence of more metaphysically loaded 
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interpretations of Kant’s critical project which look close to the kind of 
reading of Kant objected to by Moore and Prichard. 30  And in the 
contemporary philosophy of mind, some of those most centrally involved 
in the Strawsonian and Sellarsian projects have seen the completion of the 
Kantian project as requiring not the realism of Moore and Russell but the 
revival of the Hegelian idealism which they rejected. This is most evident 
in the trajectory of John McDowell, whose 1991 John Locke lectures, later 
published as Mind and World (1994), see the convergence of Strawson and 
Sellars (1994: vii-ix). One of the mains aims of that work was ‘to suggest 
that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way 
thought bears on reality’ (1994: 3). But it was also conceived ‘as a 
prolegomenon to a reading of [Hegel’s] Phenomenology [of Spirit]’ (1994: 
ix), a conception which was borne out in McDowell’s later writing 
(McDowell 2009) and in some of Robert Brandom’s recent work 
(Brandom 2002, 2015). 
The essays in this volume aim to examine Kant’s writings on the 
philosophy of mind in order to isolate what is important and distinctive 
about his views. Our hope is that renewed attention to the strength of 
Kant’s writings will help us to assess to what extent Strawson and Sellars 
were right in claiming that a viable account of the mind and mental 
phenomena can be found in Kant’s texts. Our contributors share the belief 
that there is great insight in Kant’s writings on the philosophy of mind 
and that in better understanding Kant’s views, we can work our way to a 





30 See, for instance, (Ameriks 1982, 1992, Langton 1998, Stang 2014, Van Cleve 1999), 
reacting to the epistemological or methodological reading of transcendental idealism put 
forward by Graham Bird and Henry Allison (Allison 2004, Bird 1962). 
31 Many thanks to Colin McLear and Andrew Stephenson for comments on an earlier 
version of this material. 
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